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Abstract 
 
The institution of traditional leadership has from time immemorial 
been central to traditional authority in the system of customary 
law. After the dawn of democracy in 1994, the role was 
fundamentally entrenched in the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996. The entrenchment would seem to entail the 
development of a new set of norms and a new ethos in 
customary law in line with the ideals of the new democracy, and 
the modification of certain aspects of the system. Of great 
significance for the transformation of the system is the promotion 
of the right to gender equality with reference to women's 
succession to the throne. Various commentators argue for this 
as an attempt to transform the culture of domination entrenched 
in a patriarchal system that always undermined the rights of 
women. 
Against this background, this article undertakes a comparative 
analysis of the recent judgments of the Supreme Court of Appeal 
in Mphephu v Mphephu-Ramabulana 2019 7 BCLR 862 (SCA) 
and Ludidi v Ludidi 2018 4 All SA 1 (SCA) to determine whether 
the succession of women to the throne is evidence of the desired 
transformation of the institution of traditional leadership. The 
article argues that these judgments have initiated a 
transformation which has the potential to destroy the identity of 
the institution of traditional leadership by paving the way for the 
nomination of women to occupy not just any leadership position 
in the chieftaincy but the throne itself. It also argues that the 
interpretation of the right to gender equality through the lens of 
common law instead of in its own context, which has a 
communal focus, compromises the transformative or 
developmental agenda of the institution of traditional leadership 
as envisaged in the Constitution. The discussion is limited to 
succession to the "throne" and is not applicable to other 
leadership positions such as occur in matrilineal systems, or 
regency and other such traditional leadership roles. This is also 
not a comparative study that considers other jurisdictions, is 
further limited to the concept of "gender discrimination", and 
does not deal with the other technicalities that were raised in 
these cases. 
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1 Introduction 
The institution of traditional leadership has from time immemorial been at 
the apex of customary law rules and practices. Bekker1 traces this history 
as he points out that: 
During the existence of the pre-colonial sovereign Black 'states', customary 
law was an established system of immemorial rules which had evolved from 
the way of life and natural wants of the people, the general context of which 
was a matter of common knowledge, coupled with precedents applying to 
special cases, which were retained in the memories of the chief and his 
councillors, their sons and their sons' sons, until forgotten, or until they 
become part of the immemorial rules. 
Today the history which encapsulates the institution's primary responsibility 
is grounded in the constitutional recognition of traditional leadership in the 
1996 Constitution.2 Its new status is evident in many provisions of the 
Constitution, such as section 211,3 which recognises the system of 
customary law and section 212,4 which further emphasises the recognition 
                                            
  Nomthandazo Ntlama. B Juris LLB (UFH) Certificate in Comparative Human Rights 
LLM: Public Law (US) LLD (UNISA). Professor of Public Law, Acting Head of 
Department, UNESCO "Oliver Tambo" Chair of Human Rights, Nelson R Mandela 
School of Law, University of Fort Hare, South Africa. E-mail: nntlama@ufh.ac.za / 
gatyeni20@gmail.com. 
1  See Bekker Seymour's Customary Law 11; Rautenbach Introduction to Legal 
Pluralism 209; also see Khunou 2009 PELJ 81-122, contending that the institution 
had long existed in South Africa a "socio-political and cultural organisation that 
delivered on the developmental needs of the communities and preserved the 
cultures, traditions and values of African communities before being subordinated to 
the bondages of colonial and apartheid masters". Also see Chigwata 2016 LDD 69-
90. 
2  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the 
"Constitution"). 
3  The section reads as follows: 
"(1) The institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to 
customary law, are recognised, subject to the Constitution.  
(2) A traditional authority that observes a system of customary law may 
function subject to any applicable legislation and customs, which 
includes amendments to, or repeal of, that legislation or those customs.  
(3 The courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable, 
subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with 
customary law." 
4  The section provides that: 
"(1) National legislation may provide for a role for traditional leadership as 
an institution at local level on matters affecting local communities.  
(2) To deal with matters relating to traditional leadership, the role of 
traditional leaders, customary law and the customs of communities 
observing a system of customary law: 
(a) national or provincial legislation may provide for the 
establishment of houses of traditional leaders; and  
(b) national legislation may establish a council of traditional leaders." 
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by requiring the adoption of national legislation that will give content to the 
role of the institution of traditional leadership. This recognition formally 
legitimises customary law as an integral part of South Africa's laws. It 
acknowledges the "originality and distinctiveness [of the institution] as an 
independent source of norms within the legal system"5 in regulating its own 
authority within the broader framework of the Constitution. It is also 
noteworthy that the recognition marks a fundamental break with the past, 
as it requires the development of a new set of norms, a new ethos and new 
values in terms of the new constitutional dispensation. These values include 
the norms and standards of human rights, which are inclusive of those of 
the system of customary law. In the past the system was subjugated and 
neglected or used as an instrument to oppress and divide the many South 
Africans that subscribe to it. Considering South Africa's diverse character, 
customary law, like the common law, now has to adapt, develop and 
transform in line with the ideals of the new democracy. 
Of particular importance in the transformation of customary law, which has 
been especially difficult to achieve with regard to the institution of traditional 
leadership, is the quest for the promotion of gender equality. The particular 
difficulty in this context is the question of women's succession to the 
"throne". There are various leadership positions that may be available in the 
institution of traditional leadership but the succession to the throne itself is 
strongly held to be key to determining the pace of reform and the 
transformation of the practices of the institution in the promotion of gender 
equality.6 As Chauke argues, the exclusion of women's succession to the 
throne is sometimes described as evidence of the existence of a patriarchal 
"male-dominated culture and systems of the institution of traditional 
leadership"7 that has always subjugated women. Tshitangoni reinforces the 
argument and goes further to challenge the very existence and relevance 
of the institution of traditional leadership in the new democratic 
dispensation.8 
Recent court judgments on the succession to the throne have also touched 
on the legitimacy of the institution, referencing the on-going discussions and 
debates about its relevance and the need for transformation in the 
development of the systems and ethos of customary law. These judgments 
suggest that there is a growing push towards changing the traditional 
                                            
5  See Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community 2003 12 BLCR 1301 (CC) para 51. 
6  Nkasawe 2009 https://mg.co.za/article/2008-06-24-women-traditional-leaders-
progress-or-not. 
7  Chauke 2015 Studies of Tribes and Tribals 34-39. 
8  Also see Tshitangoni and Francis 2017 Studies of Tribes and Tribals 70-83. 
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identity of the institution of traditional leadership by endorsing the 
nomination of women to succeed to the throne. Of great concern in these 
judgments is what appears to be the interpretation and application of the 
right to gender equality through the lens of common law, which was 
developed beyond and differently from the system of customary law. The 
Shilubana v Nwamitwa9 judgment is a case in point. The court in this case 
granted the right to a woman to succeed to the throne and reasoned that 
the development undertaken by the community had to be given effect by the 
courts. In this way the court legitimised the development which, the court 
argued, was in line with the Bill of Rights, as required by section 39(2),10 in 
equating the rights of men and women. It is not the intention in this article 
to revisit the argument made elsewhere, where it was contended that the 
modification of the male primogeniture rule under the guise of promoting the 
right to gender equality in the context of the succession of women to the 
throne is misplaced.11 
Given this background, this article assesses the contribution of the recent 
judgments of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in Mphephu v Mphephu-
Ramabulana12 and Ludidi v Ludidi13 to the required transformative ideals of 
the right to gender equality in the institution of traditional leadership. The 
objective is to determine whether the succession of women to the throne is 
evidence of the desired transformation of the institution of traditional 
leadership.14 The article argues that these judgments are the beginning of 
a process of transformation which has the potential to destroy the identity 
of the institution of traditional leadership by affirming the right of women to 
be elevated to the throne. It also argues that the interpretation of the right 
to gender equality through the lens of common law compromises the 
transformative or developmental agenda of the institution of traditional 
leadership that is envisaged in the Constitution. The argument is limited to 
succession to the "throne" and does not impinge on other leadership 
positions such as those in matrilineal systems, regency and other positions 
in traditional councils. This is also not a comparative study that takes other 
jurisdictions into account, is further limited to the concept of "gender 
                                            
9  Shilubana v Nwamitwa 2008 9 BCLR 914 (CC), hereinafter referred to as 
"Shilubana". 
10  The section provides that when interpreting any legislation, and when developing the 
common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
11  Ntlama 2009 Stell LR 333-356. 
12  Mphephu v Mphephu-Ramabulana 2019 7 BCLR 862 (SCA), hereinafter referred to 
as "Mphephu". 
13  Ludidi v Ludidi 2018 4 All SA 1 (SCA), hereinafter referred to as "Ludidi". 
14  Wang 2017 https://www.cmi.no/news/1834-it-takes-a-female-chief. 
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discrimination", and does not discuss the other technicalities that were 
raised in these cases. 
2 Brief facts 
2.1 Mphephu 
This was an application for leave to review and set aside the identification 
and recognition of the first respondent (Mr Toni Mphephu) as the King of 
Vhavenda community from the Limpopo Division of the High Court in 
Thohoyandou. The appellant was Princess Masindi Mphephu. This matter 
can be traced back to 26 February 1994, when the appellant's father, Prince 
Dimbanyika Mphephu, was installed to succeed his deceased father, Chief 
Patrick Ramabulana, as the chief of the Mphephu-Ramabulana Tribal 
Community. At the time, the appellant was three years old and her father 
appointed the first respondent as his Ndumi.15 After the death of the 
appellant's father in 1997, the first respondent was identified by the eighth 
respondent (Mphephu-Ramabulana Royal Family Council) to take over the 
chieftaincy in 1998. In 2003 the first respondent lodged an application for 
recognition as the King of Vhavenda, which was dismissed by Lukoto J. In 
the same year the legislature, acting in terms of section 212 of the 
Constitution, passed the Traditional Leadership Framework Act 41 of 2003 
(Original Act) as amended by Act 23 of 2009 (Amendment Act). The Original 
Act established a Commission with a five-year life span starting in 2004 with 
the authority to deal with leadership disputes and claims. The Amendment 
Act also retained the Commission, which also had a five-year life span, to 
investigate and recommend, but only in the case of a claim. The first 
respondent then lodged a claim with the old Commission, first for the vesting 
of the Kingship/Queenship of the Vhavenda to the Mphephu-Ramabulana 
Royal Family; and secondly for him to be recognised as the incumbent on 
the throne. There were also three other Vhavenda communities, namely the 
Ravhura, the Tshivhase and the Mphaphuli, that lodged claims for the 
Kingship/Queenship.16 
In January 2010 the Commission made its determination and vested the 
throne on the Mphephu-Ramabulana Royal Family to the exclusion of all 
others, without pronouncing on the incumbency of the throne.17 A public 
statement was made by the second respondent (President of the Republic 
of South Africa) on 29 July 2010 announcing the determinations of the 
                                            
15  Mphephu paras 1-4. 
16  Mphephu para 5-6. 
17  Mphephu para 6. 
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Commission in the matter of the vesting of Kingships/Queenships, which 
were inclusive of all South African communities. The second respondent 
further affirmed that the incumbents to the Vhavenda and Ama-Ndebele 
Kingships/Queenships were still to be determined by the new Commission, 
which was yet to be established.18 Following this statement, the eighth 
respondent identified the first respondent as the King of the Vhavenda on 
14 August 2010 and requested the second respondent for his recognition. 
After the failed attempt by the other three communities to challenge the 
award of the throne to the Mphephu-Ramabulana family, the second 
respondent duly recognised the first respondent, Mr Toni Peter Mphephu, 
as the King of Vhavenda Community, and this recognition was published in 
the Government Gazette of 21 September, 2012.19 
The above facts were the crux of this judgment, which dealt with the 
question whether the first respondent had lawfully been identified by both 
the Royal Family and the President as the King of the Vhavenda community. 
As noted above, this article focusses on gender discrimination and not on 
the other technicalities that were raised in the judgment and those that were 
referred back to the High Court.20 The appellant challenged the 
constitutional validity of the identification of the first respondent as the King 
at a meeting of 14 August 2010. She argued that she had not been identified 
to ascend to the throne due to gender discrimination, which offended the Bill 
of Rights.21 The basis of her argument was the criteria for the identification 
of a king or chief, which required the prospective incumbent: to be from the 
royal family and dzekiso wife; not to have a criminal record; to be a 
disciplined person (to demonstrate good behaviour); to respect his elders; 
and to be a good leader. According to Vhavenda customs a female 
(makhadzi) had to be the one to identify the king, and the identification had 
to be supported by all makhotsimunene and other khadzi. In the Mphephu-
Ramabulana family in particular, the chief or king must be a man.22 
The court reasoned that the first criterion applicable to the identification of 
the incumbent to the throne was that only men would qualify for the position. 
Though this was not explicitly stated in the minutes, the court also held that 
the impact of this criterion not only on the appellant but also on any other 
woman in the Mphephu-Ramabulana family who might otherwise meet the 
                                            
18  Mphephu para 7. 
19  See Mphephu paras-7-8. 
20  See Mphephu paras 40-42. 
21  Mphephu para 28. 
22  Mphephu para 28. 
N NTLAMA  PER / PELJ 2020 (23)  7 
criteria to succeed as queen was that she would be disqualified by her 
gender.23 It held that criteria that promote gender discrimination should be 
declared unconstitutional and invalid, and should consequently be set aside. 
It cited with approval the Shilubana judgment, that:24 
Amendments or repeal or changes of customary laws and customs should be 
in a form of development, implemented progressively by the affected 
traditional community. 
Traditional authorities as envisaged in section 211(2) are empowered to 
function subject to their own system of customary law so as to bring their 
customs in line with the values of the new dispensation. On the other hand, 
the courts are equally obligated in terms of section 39(2) to develop customary 
law in accordance with the prescripts of the Bill of Rights and to undertake this 
responsibility in a judicious, sensitive and incremental fashion. 
The court also referred to section 2A(4) of the Framework Act (original Act), 
which reads as follows: 
A kingship or queenship must transform and adapt customary law and custom 
relevant to the application of this Act so as to comply with the relevant 
principles contained in the Bill of Rights in the Constitution, in particular by: (a) 
preventing unfair discrimination; (b) promoting equality; and (c) seeking to 
progressively advance gender representation in the succession to traditional 
leadership positions. 
The court concluded that the High Court erred in dismissing the argument 
on discrimination based on gender because:25 
The criteria that only men should succeed to the Throne in the Mphephu-
Ramabulana community impedes compliance with the provisions of s 2A(4)(c) 
of the Framework Act. Section 2A(4)(c) provides for a progressive 
transformation and adaptation of the selection criteria in order to ensure that 
the customary law and custom complies with the provisions of the Bill of Rights 
on gender equality. The Vhavenda traditional communities have an obligation 
to develop the criteria for identification of a King or Queen to bring it in line 
with the Bill of Rights. In this case, s 9 of the Framework Act obliged the 
second respondent to effect recognition of an identified person as King on the 
recommendation of the third respondent. Thus the second, third and eighth 
respondents failed to consider this issue in terms of s 6(2)(e)(iii) of PAJA when 
effecting the identification and recognition respectively of the first respondent 
as King of Vhavenda. The decisions to identify and recognise the first 
respondent should thus be reviewed and set aside, as the criteria impedes 
compliance with s 2A(4)(c) of the Amended Act. 
Although the court did not pronounce on the legitimacy of the first 
respondent's identification as the King of the Vhavenda community, the fact 
                                            
23  Mphephu para 29. 
24  See Shilubana paras 73-74 in Mphephu para 30. 
25  Mphephu para 32. 
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that it invalidated the criteria for appointing the king/chief as amounting to 
gender discrimination is a cause for concern, as is argued below. 
2.2 Ludidi 
The brief facts of this case are as follows: This was an appeal from the 
Mthatha Division of the Eastern Cape. Phakade J dismissed the application 
for the review of the decision of the AmaHlubi Royal Family to recognise the 
first respondent (Ms Nolitha Ludidi - the daughter and only child of the great 
house of the late Chief Manzodidi) as the rightful heir to succeed her father, 
Chief Manzodidi. Chief Manzodidi was a brother to Chief Manzezulu and 
the eldest son of their late father: Chief Dyubhele Ludidi. Chief Manzodidi 
passed on in 1978 and was survived by his wife, Mafaku, and Ms Ludidi, 
who was twelve years old at the time. Following his death his brother, Chief 
Manzezulu, took over the chieftaincy in 1979 and ruled until his death in 
2012. 
Before the attainment of democracy, the Transkei Constitution Act 48 of 
1963 and the Transkei Authorities Act 4 of 1965 regulated the matters 
relating to traditional leadership. With the dawn of democracy a new 
statutory scheme was adopted and the system of traditional leadership is 
now regulated by the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework 
Act 41 of 2003 (Framework Act), read with the Traditional Leadership and 
Governance Act 4 of 2005 (Eastern Cape Traditional Act) in the parties' area 
of jurisdiction.26 
On the death of Chief Manzezulu a dispute arose between the appellant (Mr 
Ludidi) and the AmaHlubi Royal Family about the legitimate successor to 
the throne. Ms Ludidi was identified by the AmaHlubi Royal Family for 
recognition by the Premier of the Eastern Cape Province, whilst there was 
another MaNcaphayi family that identified Mr Ludidi for the same position.27 
Presented with conflicting decisions, the MEC for Cooperative Governance 
and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) referred the matter back to both families 
for further discussion and deliberations, after a failed attempt to resolve the 
impasse in the House of Traditional Leaders (the House). 
After extensive discussions between the AmaHlubi and MaNcaphayi Royal 
Families, in late June 2013, Ms Ludidi was identified as the successor to the 
throne, and the decision was conveyed to the MEC. It was also the June 
meeting which agreed that the appellant would be appointed as secretary 
                                            
26  Ludidi para 6. 
27  Ludidi para 5. 
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to the AmaHlubi Traditional Council (sixth respondent) so that he would be 
able to earn a salary to support his family. Thereafter Ms Ludidi was 
recognised as the next Chief of AmaHlubi and issued with a certificate of 
recognition, which was published in the Government Gazette in terms of 
section 18(1)(b) of the Eastern Cape Traditional Act 4 of 2005. However, 
the House was not advised of the recognition by the MEC before the 
publication.28 
It was this decision to recognise Ms Ludidi as the incumbent on the throne 
of the AmaHlubi Traditional Community that prompted the proceedings 
before the court. The grounds of appeal from the court a quo included the: 
appellant's legitimate expectation to succeed his father to be appointed as 
Chief under the Transkei Constitution Act; the decision by the MEC to 
recognise Ms Ludidi as the rightful chief as identified by the faction of the 
fractured AmaHlubi Royal Family; the MEC's obligation to afford the 
appellant the right to be heard before recognising Ms Ludidi; and the MEC's 
failure to inform the House of Ms Ludidi's recognition before its publication 
in the Government Gazette.29 
Without engaging in discussion of each of the grounds, the court rejected 
the appellant's reliance on his legitimate expectation to be the successor to 
the throne as envisaged in the Transkei Act. It held that when his father died 
in 2012, the entire system of regulating traditional authority and recognising 
traditional leaders was overhauled by the adoption of the Framework Act.30 
The court also affirmed the right of the AmaHlubi Royal Family to recognise 
a traditional leader as envisaged in both sections 11 of the Framework Act 
and 18 of the Provincial Act. This power was not vested in individual 
members of the Royal Family and therefore Chief Manzezulu had no right 
to identify his successor.31 The court also went on to hold that there had 
been no need for the MEC to afford the appellant the right to be heard 
because on receipt of the conflicting decisions he had referred the matter to 
the families. Further, informing the House before publishing the notice of 
recognition was not obligatory but a matter of courtesy.32 
With these facts, at face value, Ludidi appears to be distinct from Mphephu, 
whilst they are in fact interrelated. In Ludidi the decision of the AmaHlubi 
Royal Family to appoint a woman to the throne is central to the argument 
                                            
28  Ludidi paras 6-8. 
29  Ludidi para 17. 
30  Ludidi para 20. 
31  Ludidi paras 21-24. 
32  Ludidi paras 25-26. 
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which is made below. The centrality of the argument is not necessarily the 
appointment of Mr Ludidi as incumbent on the throne but the uncertainty the 
appointment of a woman brings to the future regulation of traditional 
authority. In Mphephu the invalidation of the criteria for the recognition of a 
traditional leader, leaving a vacuum for the future determination of the 
eligible heir to the throne remains problematic. The act of identifying a 
woman as successor to the throne has dire consequences for the institution 
of traditional leadership and the entire system of customary law as 
evidenced by the arguments to be made below against these judgments. 
3 The institution of traditional leadership: an "unwanted 
child" of the new democratic dispensation? 
This section highlights the on-going debates which characterise the system 
of traditional governance as an illegitimate child of the new constitutional 
dispensation. It also suggests that the arguments against the legitimacy of 
customary law are misconceived, as they conflate systems that developed 
in different settings. 
The very existence of the institution of traditional leadership is being 
challenged by critical discussion. Commentators argue that:33 
… the recognition of traditional leadership poses a threat to a democratic 
society and if the government persist on recognising them it will maintain the 
confusion people in rural areas are experiencing between the institution of 
traditional leadership and elected public representatives, … [and the 
uncertainty in clarifying the roles regarding] the existence of this institution has 
[rendered] it obsolete in our democratic dispensation. 
De Vos furthers the contention and points out that:34 
… maybe it is time for the government to … do away with the undemocratic 
and often oppressive system of traditional leadership. I suspect this will not 
happen, but I also suspect customary law will only be able to take its rightful 
place as an equal and important body of law alongside the common law – as 
required by the Constitution – when traditional leadership structures are 
fundamentally reformed and democratised. The current system is 
undemocratic and (often) oppressive and has no place in a Constitutional 
democracy. 
It is not in dispute that the institution needs to be transformed and that the 
roles of traditional leaders need to be clearly defined in line with the ideals 
                                            
33  Ncapayi and Ntungwa 2018 http://aidc.org.za/land-reform-a-critique-of-traditional-
leadership/. Emphasis added. 
34  De Vos 2010 https://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/time-for-rethink-on-traditional-
leaders/. Emphasis added. 
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of the new democracy. South Africa has been a democracy for 25 years 
now, but 25 year ago nobody knew the direction in which the "democratic 
ship" might be steered. It is the same with the application and recognition of 
the institution of traditional leadership, which had its authority undermined 
by the pre-democratic governments. In the process of re-building the 
country, including the institution of traditional leadership, continuing learning 
about the alignment of the various legal systems should have been the 
cornerstone of the integration of the law in the new dispensation. Hence, 
the above arguments are a deliberate attempt to turn a blind eye to the 
impact of South Africa's history on customary law. These arguments 
perpetuate the dominance of the common law principles which, as 
Rautenbach correctly argues, had already been subverted: 
The colonisers superimposed European law upon customary legal systems 
[though] there was neither a desire by the local people, nor any degree of 
consciousness and voluntariness on their part to receive foreign law.35 
The impact of South Africa's history on customary law as regulated by the 
institution of traditional leadership was further captured in the Gumede36 
judgment where the court held that it:37 
Was entirely prevented from evolving and adapting as the changing 
circumstances of the communities required. It was recorded and enforced by 
those who neither practised it nor were bound by it. Those who were bound 
by customary law had no power to adapt it … [and] 'official' customary law 
was left unreformed and stone-walled by static rules and judicial precedent, 
which had little or nothing to do with the lived experience of [people observing 
the system of customary law. 
The 1996 Constitution has constitutionalised the application of all South 
African legal systems, including customary law. This is particularly important 
for customary law, because the constitutional recognition requires all the 
systems to ensure their compliance with the Constitution. In this way, 
considering the decades of distortion, the constitutionalised status seeks to 
                                            
35  Rautenbach Introduction to Legal Pluralism 7. 
36  Gumede (born Shange) v President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 3 BCLR 
243 (CC), hereinafter referred to as "Gumede". 
37  Gumede para 20. Also see Langa DCJ in Bhe v Khayelitsha Magistrate 2005 1 BCLR 
1 (CC) paras 43 and 90, where the judge pointed out that "customary law was robbed 
of its inherent capacity to evolve in keeping with the changing life of the people it 
served … The outcome has been formalisation and fossilisation of a system which 
by its nature should function in an active and dynamic manner. … In the past, 
mistakes were committed which were partly the result of the failure to interpret 
customary law in its own setting but rather attempting to see it through the prism of 
the common law or other systems of law, That approach also led in part to the 
fossilisation and codification of customary law which in turn led to its marginalisation. 
This consequently denied it of its opportunity to grow in its own right and to adapt 
itself to changing circumstances." 
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fulfil a legitimate purpose and ensure that customary law lives alongside 
common law and legislation.38 In addition, it also seeks to ensure that the 
rules, practices and customs that regulate the lives of people that adhere to 
the system are transformed by the incremental changes that continue to 
evolve in their respective communities. It is trite but it must mentioned that 
customary law, notwithstanding the absence of any definition of it in the 
Constitution, is composed of rules and practices that are accepted by 
members of the various communities as binding them. There is an official 
definition in the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998,39 
though, where it is described as "usages and customs traditionally observed 
among the indigenous African peoples of South Africa, which forms part of 
the culture of those peoples." 
It is deduced from the definition that the recognition of customary law and 
its institutions meant that the "Constitution present[ed] itself as a pace-setter 
for all legal interpretive bodies including legislative and judicial authorities, 
to formulate their opinions on the basis of the current version of African law 
prevailing in the relevant communities when [dealing with] African law."40 
This aims to reclaim the lost dignity of those many South Africans who 
subscribe to the system of customary law. It is also an assertion of the 
values and principles of customary law, which the Constitution seeks to 
realise and preserve for a future South Africa. This is of great significance 
for the institution of traditional leadership. As simply characterised by the 
Court in the Pilane41 judgment, customary law:42 
is a unique and fragile institution. If it is to be preserved, it should be 
approached with the necessary understanding and sensitivity. Courts, 
Parliament and the Executive would do well to treat African customary law, 
traditions and institutions not as an inconvenience to be tolerated but as a 
heritage to be nurtured and preserved for posterity, particularly in view of the 
many years of distortion and abuse under the apartheid regime. 
Despite the caution by the Court, as noted above, there are persistent and 
strong arguments against the existence and relevance of the institution of 
traditional leadership. De Vos argues that the system is based on patriarchal 
notions about the proper roles of men and women in society and is justified 
on the basis that a chief can only become one if he was fathered by a chief, 
which perpetuates the view that men have a higher status in society than 
women; that there is a dirty little secret which is not spoken about, that many 
                                            
38  Gumede para 22. 
39  Hereinafter referred to as "RCMA". 
40  Ndima 2014 SAPL 297. 
41  Pilane v Pilane 2013 4 BCLR 431 (CC), hereinafter referred to as "Pilane". 
42  Pilane para 78. 
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communities were appointed as proxies of the apartheid government and 
would not want to diminish their power and prestige by amending customary 
law rules to recognise gender equality; and that the entire system of 
traditional leadership is deeply problematic and not really compatible with a 
system of democratic governance.43 
This criticism is misplaced, as it views the application and interpretation of 
customary law through "the lens of legal conceptions that are foreign to it".44 
It also fails to acknowledge that customary law "developed in different 
situations and in response to different cultures and conditions".45 These 
factors endorse the emphasis on "patriarchal features instead of communal 
ones".46 The criticism also failed to acknowledge that as Nhlapo contends, 
quoted with approval in Bhe, "the identification of the male head of the 
household as the only person with property-holding capacity, without 
acknowledging the strong rights of wives to security of tenure and use of 
land, for example, was a major distortion".47 Customary law was never 
designed not to entrust women with these roles, but there were factors that 
were taken into account such as women getting married and leaving for their 
marital homes.48 The continued fossilisation of customary law as was the 
case in the past distorts the very foundations of the regulation of authority 
in the system. The meanings and functions of the institution of traditional 
leadership cannot be interpreted in terms of societal values which are 
foreign to the system of customary law.49 The universal application of 
individual rights within communal rights disregards the existence of group 
rights, where values such as limiting the right to ascend to the throne to 
males serves as the cornerstone of group solidarity.50 The hereditary nature 
of the system of customary law cannot be modelled on the system of elected 
representatives, which is based on individualism. Wicomb and Smith 
characterise customary law as a:51 
                                            
43  De Vos 2010 https://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/time-for-rethink-on-traditional-
leaders/. 
44  Claassens and Budlender 2016 CCR 77. 
45  Alexkor para 56.  
46  Bhe para 89. 
47  See Nhlapo "African Customary Law in the Interim Constitution" 162; also Bhe para 
111. 
48  Ndima 2017 CILSA 92. 
49  See Ndima 2003 CILSA 333. 
50  Ake 1987 Africa Today 9. 
51  Wicomb and Smith 2011 AHRLJ 427, footnotes omitted. As simply put by Allot 1969 
Africa Spectrum 12-22: "the integration of the law with the way of life and beliefs of 
society, and a reflection of the way of life of the people; flexible in character, because 
customary law does change, can change and has changed – even in the pre-colonial 
period; qualified by kinship, that is in the private sphere the laws were organised 
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Community-based system of law in which rights are generally relational and 
not held by individuals as atomistic beings, but as members of a group and 
relational to the other members. To restrict the protection of customary law to 
individual rights, therefore, denies members of customary communities the 
ability to assert their tenure rights outside the sphere of their own communities 
and their internal, customary dispute resolution mechanisms. Customary 
systems are not based strictly on rules associated with the mainstream 
understanding of common law. In all societies there are discrepancies 
between the 'rules' people describe and the actual practices in which they 
engage. This discrepancy is particularly pertinent with regard to customary 
law systems. While underlying values and commonalities can be identified in 
customary practices, rules are not treated as a fixed structure that regulate 
societal organisation with some occasional leeway for exceptions. Rather than 
blindly referring to rules in making a decision, the current reality of every 
situation is considered and the rule tested against the customary values. 
Customary systems are thus outcomes-based rather than rule-based. Once 
custom is codified, it loses this ability to adapt contextually. 
Rautenbach similarly contends that:52 
The apex of a traditional African community is a hereditary king or traditional 
leader. Although the king and the traditional leader would normally give effect 
to the will of the people, they do not operate as democratically elected 
functionaries such as cabinets, legislative assemblies and trained and 
remunerated judges. The system functions in such a way that it allows for free 
participation in making decisions that affect members of the community. This 
happens through mechanisms such as [(imbizo) in [Xhosa] which can be 
referred to as a community gathering which normally takes place at the King's 
or traditional leader's kraal. 
Trotha shares the same sentiments, saying that the system of customary 
law was:53 
[Never designed] around the western conceptions of authority, based on 
universal suffrage, free elections, secret ballot and other democratic variables 
from a liberal perspective. It is instead grounded on a social and moral idea of 
authority and is based on a communitarian form of social relationships … the 
unity of sacred traditions and common religious beliefs … the construction of 
a common history … and the unity which domination demands. 
The argument about the problematic nature of the system of customary law 
and the call for its abandonment do not appreciate that the system is 
founded differently from other legal systems. It relegates customary law with 
its systems and values to an inferior legal status that seems to render it 
invisible to the dominant legal sphere. This is a great humiliation to the right 
                                            
around family and family relationships; customary laws were built around status 
differentiation, around the conception that everyone is not born equal, and 
differentiation by rank, sex, and age." 
52  Rautenbach Introduction to Legal Pluralism 25. 
53  Trotha 2014 Journal of Power, Politics and Governance 75 in Chakunda and 
Chikerema 2014 Journal of Power, Politics and Governance 67-78. Also see Sithole 
and Mbele 2008 http://repository.hsrc.ac.za/handle/20.500.11910/5547. 
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to dignity54 of the many South Africans that follow the prescripts of the 
system. The democratic ideals of the new constitutional order include the 
extension of civil rights to groups, as envisaged in the cultural provisions of 
the Bill of Rights.55 Hence, the civil right to dignity captures the content of 
the protection that is accorded to people subscribing to the system of 
customary law. The right to dignity should prevent the continual denigration 
of the system, which appears evident in the debates that are taking place in 
South Africa’s legal, judicial and academic circles. Since the attainment of 
democracy, the right to dignity has given rise to progress in the area of 
transforming the system of customary law. It was this system, which was 
stifled by both the colonial and apartheid governments, which has recently 
made progress in its alignment with the Constitution. 
4 Women's succession to the throne: a determinant of the 
pace of transformation in the institution of traditional 
leadership? 
4.1 The "yoke" of Shilubana in the corridors of the institution of 
traditional leadership 
This section contends that the perpetuation of the common law principles of 
gender equality in promoting the rights of women to succeed to the throne 
undermines the noble objectives of the transformative and developmental 
projects which are envisaged in the Constitution. 
The quest for the transformation of the institution of traditional leadership 
cannot be overemphasised. It can also not be denied that since the 
attainment of democracy, progress has been evident in the transformation 
of the institution of traditional leadership. However, the biggest question that 
has not been answered decisively is how to undertake the process of 
reforming customary law and its institutions. The thorn in the flesh for the 
institution of traditional leadership is in the area of gender equality, with 
reference to the succession of women to the throne.  
The court in Mphephu rejected the customary criteria for the appointment of 
the male to the throne as discrimination on the basis of gender. In Ludidi the 
act of recognising a woman was also a direct rejection of the customary 
criteria for the appointment of a traditional leader. In both these judgments, 
the court invalidated the long-standing principle of preserving succession to 
                                            
54  See s 10 of the Constitution. 
55  See for example ss 30 and 31 with their direct linkage to ss 211 and 212 of the 
Constitution.  
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the throne to the male line as discrimination against women based on their 
gender. In Mphephu the court directly adopted the approach in Ludidi. In the 
latter case, it upheld the decision of the Royal Family to recognise a woman 
whilst in the former it invalidated the criteria for succession to the throne. At 
face value, the two cases appear distinct but they are interrelated because 
they endorsed the same principle of rejecting the male primogeniture rule 
pertaining to succession to chieftaincy. The rejection is contrary to principle 
of giving a meaningful effect to the "legitimate purpose" in the upholding of 
a particular custom, which in this instance was the preservation of the throne 
through the male line. The rejection is clear evidence of the expanded force 
of the Shilubana judgment in the institution of traditional leadership. 
Rautenbach seems to have thrown in the towel and accepted that women's 
succession to traditional leadership is no longer an issue because it is 
envisaged in section 2(3) of Framework Act and was further affirmed in the 
decision of the Constitutional Court in Shilubana. It is not the intention to 
revisit the critique made in Shilubana where the Court adopted an approach 
designed to destroy the entire system of customary law by abolishing its 
traditional identity and adopting the official system of succession to the 
throne envisaged in the Framework Act. This version of the system of 
customary law might be thought to apply ore broadly as well, to the 
succession of women leaders in matrilineal systems, but that argument is 
not made in this article. 
The same Shilubana approach was adopted by the court in Mphephu, when 
it held that the criterion of limiting the succession to males offended the right 
to equality as envisaged in the Bill of Rights. The fact that the court limited 
its insight into the essence of this criterion is disturbing. The criterion is 
designed to ensure certainty of the lineage system through the male line, 
which serves the legitimate purpose of retaining the identity of the 
community in the regulation of traditional authority. It also does not 
necessarily mean that the eldest male will remain on the throne when there 
is evidence of his incapacity. Various factors such as ill-behaviour, 
misconduct and other related factors may result in the appointed heir’s 
being dethroned from the seat. The court focussed on addressing issues 
emanating from customary law through the prism of common law by also 
not acknowledging the "level of autonomy which has been acquired by 
women with the resultant number of female-headed households which 
came into existence [to the extent] of having a diluted patrilineal system".56 
                                            
56  Rautenbach Introduction to Legal Pluralism 31. 
N NTLAMA  PER / PELJ 2020 (23)  17 
In these cases, the court misdirected the lived realities of the people in their 
communities, where their own identities would so much be threatened as 
be completely destroyed. The short-term goal of resolving two customary 
law disputes lost sight of the future implications of the judgments not only 
on the respective communities but on the entire system of customary law. 
These judgments are also not "developmental", as envisaged in section 
39(2) of the Constitution, nor "transformative", as also entrenched in section 
2A(4) of the Framework Act. They have in fact compromised the equal rights 
of women to reproductive rights57 and privacy.58 They subject women to the 
unnecessary pressure of undermining their own privacy and reproductive 
rights because they will have to make, for example, uncomfortable choices 
about their private lives, such as to decide whether they will have children 
or not, or even if they will get married. If they opt for the latter, they cannot 
marry with the "throne" to the marital family, a crux of the argument in this 
paper, which means the opening of a vacuum and uncertainty on leadership 
within the system. If the woman opted to have a child without getting 
married, she would at first, engage in what I could refer to as "scouting" for 
a partner, whether the potential candidate would be of royal blood or not. 
Secondly, the partner selected would also have his own responsibilities 
towards his own royal family, as he would be expected to get married as a 
"prince". Thirdly, the child born out of such a relationship would not succeed 
her whether the father was of the royal family or not, because he or she 
would not be eligible for the succession in the family group that the woman 
chief was representing. Under a close-microscope and despite uncertainty, 
the Shilubana judgment affirmed the hereditary nature of the system of 
customary law, as it endorsed that Ms Shilubana would, "albeit not be 
succeeded by her own daughter or son but a "sociological" child born of the 
Nwamitwa bloodline".59 This is indicative that the chief in customary law gets 
married to ensure certainty of lineage and the identity of the traditional 
community, which the woman cannot provide. This means that a chief in 
customary law is born and not elected, which seems to be the approach that 
the court steered the system towards. This prompts questions on whether a 
woman assuming this role is a catalyst that transforms the institution of 
traditional leadership by succeeding to the throne, a catalyst that destroys 
the Royal Family system in customary law, that puts an end to family in 
customary law relationships, that extends royalty to those not of the royal 
blood (commoners), or that increases individualism in customary law? 
                                            
57  See s 12(2) of the Constitution. 
58  See s 14 of the Constitution. 
59  Shilubana para 90. 
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The above questions give rise to another broad question, whether women’s  
leadership qualities and skills in customary law are of relevance when they 
occupy the throne? Further, there will be uncertainty about the succession 
to the throne in the institution of traditional leadership, as these judgments 
open up possibilities for future contestation as to who might be next in line 
in the Royal Family. The approach of the court in these cases reinforces the 
argument about the irrelevance of the institution in the new democratic 
dispensation by abolishing the very foundations of the system of traditional 
authority. It endorses the tone of ridicule in the language of those who 
criticise the institution of traditional leadership, which is called atavistic and 
pedantic and thus not only contrary to democracy but its antithesis and 
nemesis; a gerontocratic, chauvinistic, authoritarian and increasingly 
irrelevant form of rule that is antithetical to democracy; a relic of the past 
that may actually impede democratic development; and a major setback to 
democracy, holding traditional values which are patriarchal, and silencing 
the views of the youth and women. Such critique condemns traditional 
leaders as being least qualified to talk about democracy.60 
In addition, the court missed an opportunity to bring about a re-orientation 
of attitudes of the people towards the institution of traditional leadership. It 
is not in dispute that the Framework Act envisages a "progressive approach" 
in the transformation of the institution. The progression entails incremental 
changes that take place over time. These changes are not to take place 
overnight but are to be infused into the entire system of customary law on a 
step-by-step basis. However, the recent judgments appear to be insisting 
on promoting gender equality in succession to the throne without limitations. 
How can that be done in a dispensation which gives equal constitutional 
recognition to all the legal systems in South Africa? It is not denied that the 
Constitution is the foundation for the promotion of the values of the new 
dispensation because of its supremacy in declaring any conduct, rule or 
practice as invalid if it is inconsistent with it.61 The same goes with the 
adoption of the Equality Act,62 which is also characterised as a unique 
                                            
60  Chakunda and Chikerema 2014 Journal of Power, Politics and Governance 67. 
61  See s 2 of the Constitution. 
62  Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000, 
hereinafter referred to as the "Equality Act". The Equality Act gives substance to s 9 
of the Constitution which reads as follows: "(1) Everyone is equal before the law and 
has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. (2) Equality includes the full 
and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement of 
equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or 
categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken. (3) The 
state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or 
more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or 
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
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instrument in the prohibition of discriminatory practices that undermine the 
human worth of a person. The Equality Act acknowledges the "progress 
made in restructuring and transforming our societies and its institutions 
which are still characterised by systemic inequalities and discrimination that 
remain deeply embedded in social structures, practices and attitudes which 
undermine our constitutional democracy".63 The Equality Act defines 
discrimination as "an act or omission, including a policy, law, rule, practice 
or situation which directly or indirectly (a) imposes burdens, obligations or 
disadvantage on; or (b) withholds benefits, opportunities, or advantages 
from, any person on one or more of the prohibited grounds."64 
It also specifically, prohibits discrimination on the grounds of gender, 
including any practice including traditional or customary law practices as 
envisaged in section 8(d). In assessing the pace of transformation or the 
development of customary law practices, a focus on the constitutionalised 
"rights approach" which is context sensitive, tracing the history and purpose 
in the determination of the legitimacy of the rule of primogeniture in the new 
constitutional dispensation could have provided a foundation for 
determining the approach to be taken, instead of ridiculing the institution as 
being un-transformative and undemocratic.  
The "rights approach" captures the content of the "differentiation approach" 
which was developed by the Court in the Harksen v Lane65 judgment. The 
judgment established a cardinal test to determine whether the practice 
differentiates unfairly between people, especially women, and is related to 
a legitimate government purpose.66 The principle in Harksen entails the 
analysis of the importance, purpose and the extent to which it promotes a 
legitimate government purpose. The Harksen test was devised earlier by 
Sachs J in Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa,67 wherein 
the judge held that courts should adopt a:68 
                                            
culture, language and birth. (4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or 
indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National 
legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. (5) 
Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless 
it is established that the discrimination is fair." 
63  Preamble of the Equality Act. 
64  See s 1(1) under "discrimination". 
65  Harksen v Lane 1997 11 BCLR 1489 (CC), hereinafter referred to as "Harksen". 
66  Harksen para 53. 
67  Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa, Matiso v Commanding 
Officer Port Elizabeth Prisons 1995 10 BCLR 1382 (CC), hereinafter referred to as 
"Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa". 
68  Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa para 46, footnotes omitted. 
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Holistic, value-based and case-oriented framework … [which] is not restrictive 
to ad hoc techinicism but rather [a focus] … on synergetic relation between 
the values underlying the guarantee of fundamental rights and the 
circumstances of the particular case. ... based on an understanding of the 
values our society is being built on and the interests at stake … that cannot 
be made in the abstract, …[and] the judge must situate the analysis in the 
facts of the particular case, weighing the different values represented in that 
context. 
Drawing from this test, the question that has to be asked is whether the 
imposition of the western concept of gender equality, which is imposed in a 
different setting of law, is related to a legitimate government purpose? In the 
context of customary law, the question that needs to be asked is whether 
the development taken by the Royal Families, the criteria in Mphephu and 
the act of recognition of a woman in Ludidi were related to a legitimate 
government purpose, which, as argued in this paper, has to do with the 
governance and authority of the institution of traditional leadership? 
Preserving the throne only to males is whether its importance and purpose 
captures the content of the legitimacy, which the rule seeks to achieve. The 
reservation of the throne to the male line and the exclusion of women are 
reasonable. They have a legitimate governmental purpose. The succession 
was not reserved specifically and only to the senior male. As noted above, 
the core determinants of the eligibility of the successor to the throne 
included that he should be a leader of high integrity and should have various 
other essential qualities, which were needed and are still needed in the 
regulation of traditional authority. This means that discrimination on the 
grounds of gender is justified, because the limitation seeks to fulfil a 
legitimate government purpose, which is the preservation of the identity of 
the institution of traditional leadership through the male line. 
With this in mind, it is a considered, firm view that the court entered the fray 
and perpetuated a threat to the existence of the institution in the new 
democratic dispensation. The minority judgment in Pilane cautioned against 
the threat and argued that:69 
Bearing in mind the need to help these fledgling institutions to rebuild and 
sustain themselves, threats to traditional leadership and related institutions 
should not be taken lightly. The institution of traditional leadership must 
respond and adapt to change, in harmony with the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights. But courts ought not to be dismissive of these institutions when they 
insist on the observance of traditional governance protocols and conventions 
on the basis of whatever limitation they might impose on constitutional rights. 
Like all others, the constitutional rights the applicants to vindicate are not 
                                            
69  Pilane para 79, footnotes omitted. 
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absolute. They co-exist within a maze of other rights to which expression must 
also be given. 
The affirmation by the court was an endorsement of customary law as a 
constitutional, legal and human rights system that is recognised in terms of 
its own prescripts. Any offending prescript or rule that emanates from it 
should equally be subject to constitutional scrutiny within its own context. In 
this way, the question arises whether the preservation of the throne to the 
male heir, acknowledging the complexity of the context of values and 
guiding principles that underlie the traditional processes of the system of 
customary law, undermines the broader principles of gender equality. This 
question has not been answered in the affirmative by the court in either 
case, as it chose the easy way out of using a common law lens through 
which to view the right to gender equality in customary law. 
5 Conclusion 
From this discussion, it is evident that there is a continued manifestation of 
the subjugation of customary law, as was the case in the past. The cases 
discussed herein are indicative of the struggle still be undertaken to bring 
customary law in line with the ideals of the new democracy. They are an 
indication of the need to transform the jurisprudence of our courts. 
Interpreting the principles of customary law in terms of those of common law 
undermines the development of the former's prescripts. These two cases, 
which were grounded in Shilubana, prevent progress from being made in 
the infusion of the ethos of constitutional law into customary law. The 
limitation of rights in customary law has not been decisively conceptualised 
by the court. Instead, the court focussed on the common law frame of 
reference in interpreting a customary law prescript. The court eroded the 
legitimate purpose of preserving the succession to the throne through the 
male line. At this stage, there appears to be a progression towards changing 
the identity of the institution of traditional leadership by the interpretation of 
the concept of gender equality within the framework of "womanhood" as a 
transformative determinant of the system of customary law. However, as 
was the case in past when customary law survived attempts to destroy it, a 
concerted effort should again be undertaken by various sectors, not only the 
institution of traditional leadership, to inhibit any attempt to prevent the 
transformation of customary law in its own context. 
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